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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Hungarian state has always been centralized throughout the 1000 years of its history. This 
fact emerged especially in the role of the meso-level governments. The systemic change in 
1990 gave to Hungary a chance to shape its own democratic political and decentralised 
governance system. It is a well-known fact that political culture and the state traditions, as 
well as the conditions of the civil society and especially the economic conditions have a deep 
impact on the shaping of power structure. However, the domestic political relations and needs 
of the state were not the only factors to determine the development of the new power 
structure. As an applicant for EU membership, Hungary made serious efforts in the last two 
decades to adjust its institutional system to the requirements of the European Union. The 
almost permanent reforms at the meso-level were mainly justified by the cohesion policy of 
the European Union. One of the Hungary’s first lessons of Europeanisation was about the 
creation of new regional units and institutions.  
The new constitution in 2011 brought fundamental changes again which also touched upon 
the meso-level governance. We can say in advance that the past of centralisation returned. 
 
 
 PART ONE : THE PRESENT SITUATION 
 
Before the systemic change  
The county has always been the traditional unit of the Hungarian local government system, 
ever since the state was founded in the eleventh century. The county organizations were 
designed to protect the interests of the king and later of the nobility. This essentially feudal 
structure remained intact until the Civil Revolution and War of Independence in 1848–1849. 
The relatively great power of the county was retained and acknowledged by the 1870 Act on 
Municipal Authorities, which was the first in the Hungarian history to regulate the public 
administration in a comprehensive way. The counties and larger cities of county rank being 
the seats of the counties continued to be the two pillars of the local government system, even 
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though the idea of a public administration reform and the elimination of the counties have 
been raised several times over the past centuries (Hajdú, 2005). 
In 1950, when Hungary became a part of the Soviet Empire, the Leninist local council system 
was introduced. The model was essentially hierarchical and centralized within the framework 
of a socialist unitary state. The councils were not the organs of local power but the local 
organs of the (unitary) power (Beér, 1951), and this was true for the county councils as well. 
The county continued to function as the transmitting unit of central government. The elected 
bodies in the villages and towns were subordinated to the county councils first legally, and 
after 1971 according to the more “liberal” regulation by economic and political means. 
 
The overture in 1990 
The systemic change led to a fundamental transformation not only in the model but also in the 
territorial configuration (Pálné Kovács, 2011). The Act on Local Governments, enacted in 
1990, resulted in a completely new situation regarding the spatial distribution of power. 
Instead of the former power structure, where the meso-tier (the county) was dominant, the 
basic level, the municipalities became the key element of the local government system. 
Freedom and independence from the central government were the focal points of the 
Hungarian model of self-governance. Legislators preparing this law were motivated mainly 
by political considerations when choosing the dominant values of the Act. The developers of 
the Hungarian local government model made conscious efforts to eliminate all the 
compulsory and hierarchic aspects. This ambition put an end to the centuries-long dominance 
of the nineteen counties. Referring to democracy and autonomy, the number of local decision-
making units was doubled: more than three thousand municipalities replaced the former about 
1600 local councils. Due to this fragmentation and the lack of willingness to form 
associations, the system became extremely expensive and still operates, in many cases, with a 
very low efficiency and quality rate. The second structural change was the almost total 
elimination of the counties’ power. The lack of competencies, means and resources was 
accompanied by an unstable political legitimacy and the lack of trust towards county 
assemblies. Using this power vacuum, the central government and the ministries in particular 
established their own “bridge-head” positions at the meso-level. Since 1990 many different 
types of deconcentrated bodies have been set up (labour, construction, education, environment 
protection, consumer protection and agriculture etc.). The increasing direct influence of the 
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central government on the territorial levels contradicted the original philosophy of letting 
local-regional issues be controlled by the local governments. 
It can be stated that the Act on Local Governments has played an extremely important role in 
the democratisation process of the Hungarian state. Local communities were given a wide 
scope of competencies and autonomy and therefore they have become important schools of 
democratic political learning. However, the structure of the local government model has not 
proved to be suitable and sustainable for the decentralization of state power. The weakness of 
the elected county governments has led to an increase of the central government’s influence in 
a form of deconcentrated public administration. We claim that the centralisation started 
paradoxically already in 1990 with the new, democratic law on local governments due to the 
coded structural problems.  
 
Correction phase until 2010 
The 1990s were actually spent with the correction of the structural problems caused by the 
first Act on Local Governments, without any real success. The Act was amended in 1994, but 
the reinforcement of the county governments did not take place, primarily because of the 
resistance of the municipalities, especially the cities of county rank, and the lack of consensus 
between the political elite. The next decade was marked by the continuous reform attempts for 
rescaling the territorial administration. This was motivated more by external EU pressure 
rather than the internal recognition of the necessity of strong meso-level government. 
The legislation on regional development policy, born in the spirit of Hungary’s accession to 
the European Union, was more successful. Although the European Union in general considers 
the public administration as a national affair, it has established a fairly influential regulation 
for using the Structural Funds. The EU cohesion policy principles of subsidiarity and 
partnership have contributed to the emergence or strengthening of the regions and made them 
virulent actors in the multilevel governance (Bache, 1998). Behind the slogan of regionalism, 
however, it is possible to detect rather varied intentions, values and even concepts of 
geographical configurations as it happened in Hungary. 
The aim of the Act on Spatial Development in 1996 was to adapt to the European regionalism, 
but it did not result in a positive turn, regarding the counties. According to the Hungarian 
regulation, the development councils established at national, regional, county and micro-
regional levels were created by delegations. A great dilemma was whether the about 160 
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micro-regional (NUTS4), the 19 county (NUTS3) or the 7 regional (NUTS2) levels should be 
the main action space of the regional political intervention and institutional system. The 
answer was based on fairly pragmatic arguments. The legislator decided to establish special 
institutions at all three territorial tiers, so called development councils referring to the 
principle of partnership. This over-fragmented institutional system, combined with the 
conglomeration of development councils operating at three territorial tiers, had three main 
consequences. It contributed to the fragmentation of the development resources, to the 
competition of the tiers among each other and to the evolving of conflicts, due to the lack of 
clear division of labour and, what is most important, the macro (NUTS2) regions were not 
able to become central actors in the regional policy. This regulation thus further eroded the 
position of the 19 county self-governments. The parallel institutional structures and the jungle 
of competing geographical (regional, county and micro-regional) units did not contribute to 
the strengthening of the meso-level. 
 
 
Figure 1 The counties and the NUTS 2 regions in Hungary 
Source: Centre for Regional Studies, HAS 
 
2002 meant a new turn in the position of county governments. The new left-wing liberal 
government announced a radical programme of regionalisation, namely the election of 
regional governments, which were organized in 2006. The ambitious governmental 
programme was not realised, even though some drafts were elaborated. The process did not 
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reach the political decision-making phase. The government re-elected in 2006 made attempts 
again towards the comprehensive reform of the constitution and the local government act, but 
it failed to gain a two third parliamentary support. The fact that the central government did not 
really consider regionalisation to be a serious matter became obvious after the unsuccessful 
reform package, when a dominant tendency towards “regional centralisation” appeared. By 
the end of 2006, the government prescribed the regional reorganisation of deconcentrated 
public administrative organs, functioning until that point primarily in the framework of the 
counties. The merger of county organisations in regional scale meant only a change of tables 
without any positive impact. Besides savings in personnel, nobody calculated the rising costs 
of travel, added to the augmentation of expenditures, compared to what real benefits the 
regionalisation would provide. A specific charm of regional integration was the designation of 
regional public administrative organs’ seats.  The cities aspiring for hosting the headquarters 
of regionalised deconcentrated organisations competed with each other and could manage that 
the official seats of different types of organisations were spread in various towns of their 
regions. This phenomenon is just one of the evidences reinforcing the artificial character of 
regions, so the boundaries and seats were in the focus of political debate.  
The progress of regionalisation in the area of spatial development was also laden with 
contradictions. The regions became the most influential units having professional 
development agencies with skilled staff and some experience in partnership cooperation, but 
after the EU accession, the entire institutional system of national development policy lost its 
positions, including the regional level. The Hungarian management system of EU Structural 
Funds became strongly centralised. Each operational programme, even the so-called Regional 
Operational Programme was managed by the National Development Agency. The regional 
development councils and agencies were not granted decision-making positions; they are only 
endowed with a certain intermediary and advisory role. Arguments in favour of centralised 
management undoubtedly existed, all the more so because the European Commission had no 
trust in regional institutional capacities and did not insist on regionalised management. It is 
still quite contradictory that the officially consciously supported process of regionalisation 
was halted after 2004. Strong centralisation and the marginalisation of regional stakeholders 
in decision-making scarcely augmented the number of the advocates of regional reform. Even 
the second programming period starting in 2007 did not bring any changes and the regions 
remained very weak actors in the EU cohesion policy. Even their role in the public 
administration was peripheral. 
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This story leads us to the conclusion that the territorial reform cannot be and should not be 
exclusively handled as a part of the European adaptation process and understood as 
subordination to the needs of regional policy. 
 
Returning to the old tradition of centralisation  
In 2010 a new period started with the ambitions of the right-wing government gaining power 
in overall terms, and also in relation to territorial public administration. Overtly defying the 
previous neo-liberal civil philosophy, Hungary can currently witness the centralising and 
nationalising efforts of the “neo-weberian” state, which has obviously to do with the 
governmental efforts to cope with the emerging economic crisis. The new government passed 
a new constitution, as a symbol of the beginning of a new era in the official idea and system 
of values of the political and government system, claiming that the original one created 20 
years before was only temporary. It is no miracle that the new law on local governments 
adopted in 2011 moved also towards a weaker and centrally more controlled model of local 
government system. The position and status of self-governments in a strong and centralised 
state underwent serious modifications, and, in the meantime, the government refrained from 
regionalisation in structural aspects with the stabilisation of counties as the meso-level of 
governance. It is important to emphasise that the counties survived only as geographical 
scales, and not as elected county self-governments. This is the end of 20 years long history of 
decentralisation in Hungary which was mostly identical with the failed experiment for making 
the meso a strong self-government. 
 
 
PART TWO : THE PRESENT SITUATION 
 
Constitutional backgrounds 
The Fundamental Law of Hungary was adapted in 2011, and promulgated at Eastern. The new 
term (‘fundamental law’ instead of the former ‘constitution’) and the timing were definitely 
symbolic, demonstrating the overture of a completely new political era. Not going into the 
details and the domestic and international discussion about the Hungarian constitution, it 
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seems to be enough to claim that the essence of the change from a governance point of view is 
the much stronger state including centralisation. The territorial aspects of governance became 
less important, or more precisely the role of the elected local/territorial governments 
weakened in favour of territorial state (deconcentrated) administration. The archaic character 
of the new constitution emerges already in the preamble: “We honour the achievements of our 
historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional 
continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation.”  
The article F states: „(1) The capital of Hungary shall be Budapest. 
(2) The territory of Hungary shall consist of the capital, counties, cities and towns, as well as 
villages. The capital, as well as the cities and towns may be divided into districts.“  
This formal regulation has actually ended the two decades long hesitation about the 
geographical scale of meso-level governance by stabilizing the space or scale of the county in 
the government system. 
In the chapter about the state in the Basic Law, the very short part on local governments 
contains the rules for the local governments in general with one speciality concerning 
exclusively the counties, namely the president of the county assembly is not a directly elected 
position as compared to the mayor. There is no any constitutional provision on the task, 
mission of county self-governments. The territorial state administration got however more 
attempt. The article 17 in the part on the central government gives general empowerments for 
the county government offices: “The capital or county government offices shall be the 
territorial state administration organs of the Government with general competence.”   
So the constitutional background has provided legal frames for the later legislation to fulfil 
the counties as geographical units with completely different power content, thus with much 
more central, top down state influence and much less elected, bottom up self-governance. 
 
The new law on local governments and counties 
The necessity of the local government reform was generally accepted both by political and 
professional circles since many reform documents emerged and were discussed during the last 
decades in order to solve the functional problems. The fragmented structure of municipalities 
and the weakness of the county assemblies resulted in low quality of performance and 
financial problems. The latter led to crucial financial crisis accelerated by the global economic 
and financial crisis started in 2008. So the new government had to do something. Possessing 
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two-third majority in the National Assembly it was able to do essential changes even without 
compromise with the parliamentary opposition.  
The new act was adopted in 2011, but several parts of it came into force at different times 
later. The Law on Local Self-Governments (No. CLXXXIX of 2011) fundamentally changed 
the whole system and also the role of the counties. As the new neo-weberian state philosophy 
emerged already in the Fundamental Law, the centralisation became dominant in the 
regulation of the local government system. Local governments as a whole have lost many 
competences in public services and their former „freedom” in the financing was subordinated 
to stricter legal control. We have to mention that the report of the Council of Europe in 2013 
on the Hungarian local government reforms criticised many aspects of the law (CoE, 2013). 
But the biggest losers of the reform are the counties. We can say „again” since counties have 
had minimal presence in the political architecture prior to this reform, but due to recent 
developments they became seriously weaker (CoE, 2013). 
The management of numerous public institutions (hospitals, schools, etc.) was taken over by 
the Central Government already in 2010-2011 before the new legislation communicating the 
necessity of nationalisation by the financial crisis of county assemblies. Instead of the former 
mission of running public services the primary function of the counties became regional 
development. As 27. § formulated: „The county assembly is territorial self-government which 
according to law fulfils tasks of territorial development, rural development, physical planning 
and coordination”. This is the only special regulation for county assemblies in the entire law 
on local governments. The law regulates the organisation, finance, control and other issues of 
local governance in general and these regulations are of course relevant for the county 
councils as well. The most important element in the new model is, however, that counties as 
self-governments have lost all of their own competences possessed before. What they have 
got as „compensation” is the very vaguely defined mission of regional development. 
In order to understand the power structure of the meso-level we have to note that the special 
status of the county towns (the seats of the counties irrespective their size and independently 
from cities over 50000 inhabitants) was preserved, due to the long administrative tradition of 
Hungary (we have all together 23 cities with county rank). As a consequence, the jurisdiction 
of the county government does not cover these cities resulting in serious obstacles to the 
territorial cooperation. The county towns even won a bit due to the new regulation since the 
maintenance of some public service institutions has been transferred to their jurisdiction. 
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The new law (No. 2010. L.) on the election of local council members and mayors 
dramatically changed the former system. It reduced the number of local representatives with 
30%, but in the case of the counties and larger cities, the scale of the representative bodies 
was reduced to less than the half of the former size (the present figure is 391 instead of the 
former 835 in the whole country). Another change in the county election system is that the 
former dual list system has been eliminated. There are single lists of parties making the 
system easier and more transparent. The former model was really confused, distinguishing the 
representation of smaller and bigger settlements. This rather symbolical amendment however 
shows also the changing political attitude, that is the dominance of the parties without any 
‘territorial’ embeddedness. It is just a nuance that, besides the parties other civil organisations 
can have a list only when they obtain the recommendation from minimum 1% of the county 
population instead of the former 0,3%. As a result, the non-party organisations almost 
completely disappeared from the county assemblies (after the election in 2014 from the 418 
representatives elected in the counties only 3 members are independent.). 
It was therefore clear, even prior to the elections, that the new county assemblies will be much 
smaller and more homogeneous. 
 
	  Results	  of	  county	  election	  in	  2014	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   Fidesz	   Jobbik	   MSZP	  
Mean	  of	  county	  results	  (%)	  	  	   53.1	   21.1	   13.8	  
Standard	  deviation	  of	  county	  results	  (%)	   3.75	   3.82	   3.05	  
Relative	  standard	  deviation	   0.07	   0.18	   0.22	  
Source: www.valasztas.hu//hu/onkval2014/ 
 
The results of the county elections in 2014 show the dominance of the ruling parliamentary 
conservative party (Fidesz) and the expansion of the radical right wing party (Jobbik) as well.  
It is also clear that the two stronger parliamentary oppostional parties, Jobbik and the leftwing 
MSZP have geographically more polarised support, which means that the counties provide 
firm background for the nationwide politics of the ruling party 
	  
Developments after the cardinal legislation 
This report does not deal with the local governance system in general, but it is important to 
know that the firm centralisation concerned all of the municipalities and cities. The whole 
sector has been shrunk in competences, budget, assets, staff, power and independence. The 
reason why I think, that the biggest losers are the counties, is because even their status as self-
government has been questioned since they are not empowered by “general competence” any 
more (as it is one of the requirements of the European Charter of Local Governments). 
County assemblies are rather “single issue organisations” responsible for development policy. 
The model itself raises many doubts whether a representative body without any competences 
in public services, any legal links with municipalities, any own resources, is able to manage 
development policy? What is more, without skilled staff and administrative capacity, how do 
they fulfil this mission? The mission of regional development however would be very 
important since disparities among counties have been increasing dramatically. The figures 
below) show that in spite of the EU cohesion policy the capital city and the western part of the 
country have started growing first after the EU accession. 
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GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  avarage,	  1995-­‐2012	  	  
 
 
Source: National Statistical Office 
http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/ 
 
These questions, doubts concerning the new governance system of development policy cannot 
be answered yet, because the activity of the counties at this field is almost invisible. The law 
on regional development (No. 1996. XXI.) has been amended in 2013. It cancelled the macro 
regions (NUTS 2) and the whole development council system. Instead of them, this 
amendment aimed at strengthening the county self-governments, and listed the competences 
of the county assemblies. However, these competences are vaguely formulated (planning, 
coordinating, participating etc.), their real policy impact depends on the financial instruments, 
and the real practice of development policy led by the central government.  
The counties have been participating in the very intensive domestic and EU planning process. 
They had to prepare and adopt the county development plans for the National Development 
and Territorial Development Conception passed by the Hungarian Parliament in 2014. 
Of course, the European cohesion policy plays a more important role since the European 
Structural and Investment Funds provide almost all of the resources for Hungary to catching 
up in the next programming period 2014-2020. As a basis for development policy, the so-
called Partnership Agreement between the EU Commission and Hungary has been signed.  
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This document contains also some parts on the domestic management system, claiming that 
the counties as NUTS3 units will be the most important platforms of territorially decentralised 
investments, in strong relation with the reform in territorial administration. The single 
territorial operative programme will be the frame of small scale development projects in the 
field of local economy, employment, tourism, public services etc. It seems from the official 
domestic EU planning documents that about 10 percent of the EU subsidies will be allocated 
in the frame of territorial operative programme. It would be however too early to predict what 
will be the role of the county assemblies in the real decision making.  
 
Counties as geographical frames of deconcentrated public administration 
The fact, which proves that the ruling political elite has chosen the county as a stable scale for 
public administration and development policy, is more striking in the institutionalisation of 
county deconcentrated public administration. It is an unambiguous fact that the county 
government offices are much more powerful actors than the elected county assemblies. Their 
crucial role has been already guarantied in the Constitution. The government’s firm ambition 
was in 2010 to make ‘order’ in the very fragmented territorial state administration. Similarly 
to the central level, where the prime minister (and his office) became the strongest person and 
position, the county government office with the government commissioner appointed by the 
prime minister became the power centre of the county. This was the first time when there was 
enough political will and power force to integrate most of the territorial branches of line 
ministries into one single government office. The deconcentrated sector became more 
integrated and it has also been expanded at the same time, due to the nationalisation efforts in 
the public services. The hospitals, schools, elderly homes etc. maintained before by the county 
assemblies are managed by the newly established state organisations. The nationalised 
schools for example belong to the National School Maintaining Centre employing more than 
one hundred thousand teachers. A separate nationwide office runs the hospitals. Referring to 
the increased state duties, the government introduced new territorial units, the districts 
(175+23 in the capital) as well in order to assist the functioning of the mega-organisations and 
also to get closer to the citizens. The circle has been closed. The narrowing self-government 
system has been replaced by the expanding deconcentrated state administration instead of 
enabling local and territorial elected bodies for more efficient service provision. 
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Self-governments of minorities 
Hungary has a special legal regulation and representation for national and ethnic minorities. 
Article XXIX (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary states that „Nationalities living in 
Hungary shall have the right to establish their own self-government at both local and national 
level.” This seemingly generous regulation however amended the former model of minority 
representation since there is no ever opportunity to create minority self-governments at county 
level. This change is also slight evidence that the county-level will not be a real political 
representational platform in the future either. 
 
 
PART THREE : CURRENT REFORM AND DEBATES 
 
Current reform and debates 
The government has not announced any new reform attempt, considering the new structure 
introduced in the last years as complete. However there are trends, measures which predict the 
process in territorial administration and services in the future. It seems that the nationalisation 
of services provided formerly by local governments or private actors will be continued in 
social care and communal infrastructure. But these steps do not touch the position of the 
county assemblies since they have no any public service competences any more. At least their 
legally declared competence of ‘co-ordination’ can be understood as a mean of co-ordinating 
the activities of municipalities in some fields of services and development. 
It is also an open question how cities will be enabled for local economic development having 
no means and discretional rights in strategic planning and local taxation. The institutional 
frame of municipal co-operation is also missing although the successful absorption of EU 
cohesion funds depends on the ability of cities in developing local economy, infrastructure 
and human capacities. 
The shift towards the stronger central state responsibility is of course politically disputed by 
the associations of self-governments and oppositional parties, but honestly said, most of the 
people is rather neutral concerning the massive centralisation. In the next years there will be a 
big experiment on how will the central state portfolio copes with the increasing tasks. 
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Important lesson is that actors of decentralised power have not enough strong guaranties to 
preserve their position and empowerment. The ‘meso’ is in specially fragile position since not 
only the centrally located actors and institutions are ‘jealous’ towards sub-national levels, but 
also the municipalities, especially the cities are not enthusiastic  being ‘subordinated’ by any 
upper levels. The civil, democratic embeddedness and identity are crucial factors, also in 
legitimating the regional governments. Without democratic support, it is hard to save the 
power position. When the conflicts between governance levels bypass the publicity, these 
remain only closed bargaining with less chance to win. It is true, however, that the meso level 
governments have a hard job, as they have to sell their mission to the public. 
 
 
SUMMARY  
 
Counties in Hungary have gradually been excluded from the power arena after the systemic 
change. In the first decades, the dilemma of geographical scale was on the agenda, as the main 
argument why counties were (are) not addressed by real power and competences. The reform 
experiments with the micro and macro regions failed, the counties as public administrative 
frames remained on the map, in spite of the fact that EU accession and the cohesion policy 
were a crucial external driving force for the reform. However, as elected self-governments, 
they have almost disappeared from the territorial governance system, losing their assets, 
competences, local networks and legitimacy. The county self-governments are the victims of 
the strong centralisation taking place in Hungary, so there is no democratic meso- level to 
counterbalance the oversized central power. The inner driving forces are still missing for 
recognition of necessity of regional decentralisation. 
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